We Know What Needs To Be Done: A Book Review of "End Times" by Peter Turchin

 

Book: End Time: Elites, Counter-Elites And The Path Of Political Disintegration by Peter Turchin (352 pages for the Kindle edition).

Overview: In this follow-up to his 2016 book, Ages of Discord (which I reviewed here), Turchin further explores his theory of the link between social unrest and the twin factors of elite overproduction and popular immiseration, this time better backed up by further development of a historical database and refined model on which he relies. He explains that the United States is currently experiencing popular immiseration and elite overproduction which set the stage for Trump's election in 2016, and will continue to breed social unrest and opposition to the elites until those two factors are addressed. 

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    John Wilder, in his Wilder, Wealthy & Wise blog, recently published a post entitled "We Already Know The Solutions," in which he posits that for most issues we face, we already know what to do. Not that we can look at a math problem, for instance, and immediately know the answer, but we know that if we want to solve the math problem we will have to put in the work and apply the rules of mathematics to solve the problem. The issue is generally more of will or overcoming some other aversion to doing what needs to be done. In his article, he focuses on the current issues we are facing of crime and uncontrolled illegal immigration and observes that we all know that to address these issues: we need to make the consequences of crime and illegal immigration so uncomfortable that the people involved in those activities turn to alternatives. For instance, illegal immigration could be solved by ejecting illegals from the country no matter their circumstances (or sob story); and if they have anchor babies, they can take the children with them or have the children go into foster care--but the illegal parents will still be ejected. It is just that solutions like these are currently unpalatable to the political class and the elites.

    I had much the same feeling reading Turchin's book: he knew the solution, he even explains how it historically came about in other "ages of discord" but he does not explicitly state what needs to be done.

    As an initial matter, to understand Turchin's theories, you need to understand what he means by "elites". "In sociology," he explains, "elites are not those who are somehow better than the rest. They are not necessarily those who are more hardworking, or more intelligent, or more talented. They are simply those who have more social power—the ability to influence other people. A more descriptive term for elites is 'power holders.'" (p. 3). "These are the people who concentrate most of the social power within a state in their hands. They are the ones who make decisions at the level of the whole society on matters such as war and peace, social and economic policy, taxation and redistribution of resources, and legislation and law enforcement." (p. 297). Although a somewhat broader term because it incorporates a larger faction of government and private bureaucracy, intellectuals, educators and so on, it is similar to Angelo Codevilla's term "the Ruling Class" which identifies the upper echelons of the elites.

    Turchin's theory, in a nutshell, is this:

All complex human societies organized as states experience recurrent waves of political instability. The most common pattern is an alternation of integrative and disintegrative phases lasting for roughly a century. Integrative phases are characterized by internal peace, social stability, and relatively cooperative elites. Disintegrative phases are the opposite: social instability, breakdown of cooperation among the elites, and persistent outbreaks of political violence, such as rebellions, revolutions, and civil wars.

(p. 29). The integrative phases seem to be marked by more compact pyramids of powers with a relatively small number of elites compared to the greater mass of citizenry and if not prosperous, at least a population content with its economic position and prospects. On the other hand, Turchin's "analysis points to four structural drivers of instability: popular immiseration leading to mass mobilization potential; elite overproduction resulting in intraelite conflict; failing fiscal health and weakened legitimacy of the state; and geopolitical factors." (p. 30). Of these, he notes, intraelite competition and conflict is the most important factor; the other factors are less important and, in some cases--such as geopolitical factors--may be missing. However, in all of his examples, popular immiseration also played a key role. I would also note that the remaining three factors--fiscal health, weakened state legitimacy, and geopolitical factors, can be derived from or a symptom of the first two factors. 

    These alternating periods of integration and disintegration, he notes, tend to come and go in cycles, probably because they depend on generational issues: one generation of elites may learn their lessons from a period of instability, enact reforms, and marshal in a period of integration; but subsequent generations will forget or ignore those lessons, ushering in a period of disintegration and social upheaval. Thus, Turchin notes, "[t]his dynamic sets up a recurrent cycle of violence of roughly fifty years in length (that is, two human generations), which persists until the structural conditions are somehow resolved, leading to the next integrative phase." (p. 30). However, the length of these cycles are not set in stone. Nevertheless, Turchin indicates that his team has not identified an integrative phase of more than 200 years. (p. 29).

    Of the factors leading to periods of instability, intraelite conflict is the easiest to understand because it revolves around elite overproduction. That is, there are only so many slots or positions available for elites. For instance, in a medieval kingdom, there is only one king and only so many princes, dukes, and so on, which can be supported beneath this. It was possible to siphon excess nobility into the medieval Church or a few other positions (a sheriff or bailiff or magistrate, for instance), but that can only go so far until there simply are not enough elite positions to take in the numbers of elites wanting those positions. When there are enough slots to go around, the elites can and will come to compromises, but when there are not enough slots there will be a growing number of frustrated elite aspirants that will form into what Turchin terms "counter-elites": those elites setting themselves up as opposed to the elites and willing to take advantage of popular immiseration and discontent.

    Elite overproduction can come about in various ways. The most simple and direct method historically is simple reproduction: elites having many children which (because of their elite status) tended to be more likely to survive to adult hood. This is particularly a problem in polygamous societies (such as common in the Middle or Far East) because a king or prince, for example, might have many wives and produce a great number of offspring, all of which will vie for power. Thus these types of cultures tend to be more politically unstable. Alternatively, in modern society as well as Confucius China, elites can also be produced by a system of credentialization where access to ranks of the elites can be achieved through education and some system of selection. 

    The other key factor is popular immiseration: a general decline in well being of the great mass of people (the "deplorables" as Hillary Clinton described them), especially vis-à-vis the elites. We know from our study of history that the well-being of commoners can decline for many reasons outside the control of the elites: war, pestilence, natural disasters, changes to climate can lead to declining wealth, famine, or death. However, these types of black swan events do not, with the one exception of epidemics (whether of germs or memes), really factor into Turchin's analysis; probably because these are black swan events that can be weathered in an integrative phase and, at least in more modern times, are merely an aggravating factor during disintegrative phases. 

    Turchin instead focuses on declining relative wages and what he terms the "wealth pump." He explains:

The fruits of economic growth have to go somewhere. If the state’s revenues are a relatively constant proportion of GDP, while the wages of common workers claim a decreasing proportion, the fruits of economic growth will be reaped by the economic elites that include the top earners (e.g., CEOs, corporate lawyers) and owners of capital. It takes time, but eventually the wealth pumped from the common people to the elites results in elite overproduction, intraelite conflict, and, if not checked in time, state collapse and social breakdown. The rich are perhaps even more vulnerable than common people during such periods of social and political turbulence, as outcomes of social revolutions suggest.

 (p. 81). Turchin notes that most elites do not particularly care about the fortunes of the non-elites, or "deplorables," because "[i]n most complex human societies, the upper classes feel a measure of disdain for the lower classes. 'The peasants are revolting.'" (Id.) But they should. He writes: 

But then you should consider another and very serious reason why the declining well-being of the working class is a bad thing—because it fundamentally undermines the stability of our society. Most obviously, when large swaths of the population experience falling living standards, this undermines the legitimacy of our institutions and thus weakens the state. Popular immiseration increases mass mobilization potential. In the past, peasants revolted when their misery could not be borne anymore. The Peasants’ Revolt in England and the Jacquerie in France were such eruptions during the Late Medieval Crisis. Forward-looking 0.01-percenters, such as Nick Hanauer, have been warning us that the pitchforks are coming if we don’t do something to fix glaring inequities.

(Id.) 

    Turchin offers some historical examples of the interplay between elite overproduction and popular immiseration. One of the examples he traces is France which had experienced a golden age of sorts during the 13th Century. 

    Toward 1300, however, the brilliance of the French kingdom began to tarnish. The golden age turned into a gilded age. While elite opulence continued unabated, the living conditions of common people deteriorated. The root cause of popular immiseration was the massive population boom in Western Europe in the two centuries before 1300. If in 1100 there were around six million people inhabiting the territory within the modern borders of France, two centuries later the population more than tripled, exceeding twenty million. Population explosion overwhelmed the capacity of the medieval economy to provide land for peasants, jobs for workers, and food for all. The majority of the population lived on the edge of starvation, and a series of crop failures and livestock epidemics between 1315 and 1322 tipped the system over the edge. By 1325, the population of France was 10–15 percent below the peak it reached in 1300. Then came the Black Death, killing between one-quarter and one-half of the population. By the end of the fourteenth century, the population of France collapsed to ten million—half of what it was in 1300.

    As though millions of deaths were not enough, the demographic catastrophe had another, more subtle but nevertheless devastating effect on social stability by making the social pyramid unsustainably top-heavy. After 1250, the number of nobles increased even faster than that of the general population, because their economic position was better than that of the commoners. In fact, popular immiseration benefited the elites, who profited from high land rents, low wages, and high food prices. In other words, massive overpopulation during the thirteenth century created a wealth pump that enriched landowners at the expense of peasants.

    As their incomes increased, many lower-rank nobles found that dividing their estates between two or more sons could allow all heirs to have enough income to maintain noble status. Wealthy magnates with far-flung possessions used some inconveniently located properties to set up younger sons as middle-rank nobles. There was also an increased rate of upward social mobility, with wealthy peasants and successful merchants ascending into nobility. When the famines and epidemics hit, the elites were better positioned to ride them out, suffering lower mortality than the commoners. All of these trends combined to increase the number of nobles in relation to the productive class, making the social pyramid top-heavy and, after a lag time, reversing the economic fortunes of the nobility. Whereas before 1300 the nobles enjoyed a favorable economic conjunction in which there were relatively few elites and cheap, plentiful labor, by the mid-fourteenth century the situation was completely reversed.

    Lacking revenues to sustain their elite status, nobles responded by seeking employment with the state and by extracting a greater proportion of resources from the peasants. However, the state could not employ all impoverished nobles—there were too many of them, and the crown itself was sliding into financial insolvency. Inflation of prices, driven by the massive population growth, ate into state revenues, and attempts to respond to elite demands strained royal finances beyond the breaking point.

    Extracting greater revenues from peasants meant that the landlords went beyond skimming the surplus and started cutting into the resources that peasants needed to survive. Landlord oppression undermined its own economic basis, as peasants responded by flight, starvation, or death in futile rebellions. As both of these strategies failed, the nobles turned to preying on each other. The elite overproduction game entered its final, violent phase, and intraelite conflicts popped up all over France. In the 1350s, the breakdown of internal order reached the heart of the kingdom.

(pp. 31-33). Subsequently, France entered into a dynastic conflict that dragged in the English kings: a period we call the Hundred Years War. 

    Although the English armies had largely been expelled and internal rebellions put down by 1380, the relative peace was transitory because, Turchin asserts, "the structural forces driving France into crises--popular immiseration, elite overproduction, and state weakness--had not yet been property addressed." (p. 34). France went through a repeat of the period from 1350s through the 1380s, only finally to expel the English and restore order about 1453. 

    Following the end of the Hundred Years’ War, France enjoyed a century-long integrative phase. Why was the century before 1450 so bleak and the one after so brilliant? The answer is that the forces pushing France into internal warfare ceased operating around 1450. Popular immiseration was “taken care of” by the famines, epidemics, and internal warfare, whose cumulative effect was to halve the French population. There was now plenty of land for peasants, and the dearth of labor more than doubled workers’ real wages. Plunging land rents and increasing wages effectively shut down the wealth pump.

    “Most importantly, the hecatombs of Crécy, Poitiers, Agincourt, and a host of lesser-known battles removed tens of thousands of “surplus” nobility. ...

(p. 35). That is:

While the overall population was halved between 1300 and 1450, the number of nobles in the same period declined by a factor of four. The social pyramid ceased to be top-heavy, regaining a much more stable configuration, with a broad base and a narrow top. In the absence of elite overproduction, intraelite competition and conflict subsided. At the same time, the memory of the dark period of social breakdown and the external pressure from the English forged a new feeling of national unity among the elites. In this new climate of intraelite cooperation, it proved to be possible to reform state finances and provide France with a solid fiscal foundation for generations ahead.

(Id.).

     Turchin also explains how the United States has gone through similar cycles. 

The United States, like any other complex society, has gone through alternating integrative and disintegrative phases. The first disintegrative phase began circa 1830 and ended circa 1930. Within that period, there were two spikes of collective violence, separated by roughly fifty years: the Civil War (and its violent aftermath) and the instability peak around 1920. At the end of the first age of discord in the US, the governing elites, frightened by the levels of political violence that it wrought, managed to pull together and agree on a set of reforms that brought the first age of discord to an end. These reforms were initiated during the Progressive Era, starting around 1900, and finalized during the New Deal of the 1930s. One of the most important outcomes was an unwritten social contract between businesses, workers, and the state that gave workers the right to organize and collectively bargain, and ensured that they would more fully participate in sharing the gains of economic growth. This agreement was broader than just economics; it enshrined the idea of social cooperation between the different parts of society (in cliodynamic terms, the commoners, the elites, and the state). Although initially there was fierce resistance against the contract by certain segments of the elites, the success of the country in dealing with the aftermath of the Great Depression and then World War II convinced all, except for a relatively small fringe, that this contract was a good thing. 

(p. 73). Even as conditions and wages improved for the average worker, the wealth of the super-wealthy declined, as did the number of super-wealthy. 

    In any event, the social contract arrived at in the 1920s and '30s began to break down in the 1970s. "“In the 1970s, a new generation of elites began replacing the 'great civic generation.' The new elites, who didn’t experience the turbulence of the previous age of discord, forgot its lessons and started to gradually dismantle the pillars on which the postwar prosperity era was based."

    Who where these new generation of elites?  They were the children and grandchildren of what Turchin describes as our first true national upper class. (p. 124).

 As the left-leaning historian Gabriel Kolko wrote in The Triumph of Conservatism, “The business and political elites knew each other, went to the same schools, belonged to the same clubs, married into the same families, shared the same values—in reality, formed that phenomenon which has lately been dubbed The Establishment.

(Id.). If this sounds familiar to you already, it may be because Angelo M. Codevilla wrote something similar about our ruling class in his 2010 article, "America’s Ruling Class—And the Perils of Revolution." Codevilla noted:

Today’s ruling class, from Boston to San Diego, was formed by an educational system that exposed them to the same ideas and gave them remarkably uniform guidance, as well as tastes and habits. These amount to a social canon of judgments about good and evil, complete with secular sacred history, sins (against minorities and the environment), and saints. Using the right words and avoiding the wrong ones when referring to such matters — speaking the “in” language — serves as a badge of identity. ...

    At the same time this new elite was casting off the old social contract, "worker wages came under pressure from diverse forces that shifted the balance of the supply and demand for labor. The supply of labor was inflated by the large baby boomer generation seeking jobs, by increased participation of women in the workforce, and by greatly increased immigration." (p. 74). As Turchin points out, relative wages have not declined in such a sustained manner since the three decades between 1830 and 1860. (p. 80). Except that we are well beyond three decades of decline.

    Of course, "popular immiseration" is not just a matter of stagnant or declining real wages. "Diminished economic conditions for the less educated were accompanied by a decline in the social institutions that nurtured their social life and cooperation. These institutions include the family, the church, the labor union, the public schools and their parent-teacher associations, and various voluntary neighborhood associations." (p. 77). Thus, the average American has seen not just wages decline, but also marriage rates, economic prospects, and life expectancy. (p. 78). Even the height of the average American has been declining. (p. 80).

    Turchin goes on to describe the United States as a plutocracy. That is, he notes, once you include the preferences of the top 10 percent and interest groups, "the effect of the commoners [on national policy] is statistically indistinguishable from zero." (p. 130). And "issues on which the common people and the economic elites disagree are always--always--resolved in favor of the elites." (Id.).  

Another consideration is that this analysis addressed only what political scientists call the “first face of power”: the ability of citizens to shape policy outcomes on contested issues. But the “second face of power,” shaping the agenda of issues that policy makers consider, is a subtle but extremely powerful way for the elites to get their way. Finally, the “third face of power” is the ability of ideological elites to shape the preferences of the public.

(Id.)

    So, to brief, due to popular immiseration and elite overproduction, the United States is heading into a period of social unrest and, potentially, civil war. Is there a way to avoid this outcome--to make changes as happened in the 1920s and 1930s? Well, there are certainly steps to be taken. 

    First, to address popular immiseration, one of the first steps would be to address the decline in relative wages. "The economic argument is very clear. Massive immigration increases the supply of labor, which in turn depresses its cost—in other words, worker wages. Clearly, such development benefits the consumers of labor (employers, or 'capitalists') and disadvantages the workers." (p. 132). He also notes that "[a] key development in shutting down the wealth pump was the passage of the immigration laws of 1921 and 1924." (p. 149). "Shutting down immigration reduced the labor supply and provided a powerful boost to real wages for many decades to come." (p. 150). Thus, immigration must be frozen and, where possible--such as with illegal immigrants and workers here on temporary visas--it must be reversed. 

    Related to this is globalization, especially the export of jobs. Turchin notes that "globalization is wielded by the governing elites to increase their power at the expense of the non-elites. It’s another wealth pump that takes from the workers and gives to the 'bosses.' It is also a global wealth pump that transfers wealth from the developing world to rich regions." (p. 134). Thus, globalization must be addressed. Although Turchin does not suggest a solution to this issue, I have suggested that the method to control this would be to clamp down on the export of "know-how" such as manufacturing techniques and processes, including trade secrets and other intellectual properties. One way to do this would be remove legal protections for intellectual property where a company has moved production offshore. 

    Turning to the issue of elite overproduction, Turchin observes that "death is the great leveler," adding that "[t]ypically, it takes a major perturbation to reduce wealth inequality, and this perturbation usually takes the form of a social revolution, a state collapse, a mass-mobilization war, or a major epidemic." (p. 153). It doesn't have to be this way. Turchin explains that over time, increasing workers wages faster than the increase of GDP per capita will choke off the creation of new super-rich. (p. 195). 

But such a gradual, gentle decline assumes that the social system maintains its stability. Analysis of historical cases in CrisisDB [Turchin's data base he is using to study and predict sociatal upheaval] indicates that the much more frequent scenario of downward social mobility, which eliminates elite overproduction, is associated with periods of high sociopolitical instability, the “ages of discord.” In such cases, downward mobility is rapid and typically associated with violence. Political instability and internal warfare prune elite numbers in a variety of ways. Some elite individuals are simply killed in civil wars or by way of assassination. Others may be dispossessed of their elite status when their faction loses in a civil war. Finally, general conditions of violence and lack of success discourage many “surplus” elite aspirants from continuing their pursuit of elite status, which leads to acceptance of downward mobility.

(Id.) But he also doesn't believe that a revolution is possible because "a successful revolution requires a cohesive and organized revolutionary party with deep popular support," but such a group "cannot be built while the federal police remain effective. The surveillance and coercive apparatus of the state is just too strong." (p. 208). The only way that he sees any such revolutionary party forming is through the transformation of the Republican party from a party of the 1 percent to a party of populism. And, interestingly, he sees Tucker Carlson as key: "Carlson is growing ever more popular. He is currently the most listened-to political commentator in America. He is also interesting in that he has a clearly formulated and coherent ideology, which is conveniently laid out in his 2018 book, Ship of Fools: How a Selfish Ruling Class Is Bringing America to the Brink of Revolution." (p. 216). He also notes that "Tucker Carlson is a very dangerous man," and suggests that "Tucker Carlson, rather than Donald Trump, may be a seed crystal around which a new radical party forms." (pp. 218 and 219).

    Nevertheless, Turchin does not believe it is possible to avoid social unrest this decade. He explains:

... to bring the system to a positive equilibrium, the [wealth] pump must be shut down. We can model this by driving the relative wage up to the point where upward and downward rates of mobility between commoners and elites are balanced (and then keeping it at this level by ensuring that worker wages increase together with overall economic growth). It turns out that this intervention will not eliminate or even have much of an effect on the 2020s peak—there is too much inertia in the social system. Furthermore, it will have an undesirable effect in exacerbating elite overproduction. Shutting down the pump reduces elite incomes, but it does not decrease their numbers. This is a recipe for converting a massive proportion of the elites into counter-elites, which will most likely make the internal war even bloodier and more intense. However, after a painful and violent decade, the system will rapidly achieve equilibrium. The PSI [Political Stress Index] will reach its minimum, the proportion of the population that is radicalized will fall, and the surplus elites will be eliminated. The only memory of the Troubles of the Twenty-Twenties will be in the high proportion of moderates, who will gradually fade away toward 2070. The end result will be a “sharp short-term pain, long-term gain” outcome.

(p. 202). 

    In the end, however, "[f]or the ruling class, there are two routes out of a revolutionary situation. One leads to their overthrow. The alternative is to adopt a series of reforms that will rebalance the social system, reversing the trends of popular immiseration and elite overproduction." (p. 222). Unfortunately, he does not believe that the current crop of elites will willingly adopt reforms. And so the wages of the elites (and, unfortunately, many common Americans) will be death. In his historical studies, Turchin found that half of the exits from crisis resulted in population losses. (p. 223). Of these, 30 percent were associated with a major epidemic. (Id.) In addition, in nearly two-thirds of cases the crisis resulted in massive downward mobility from the ranks of the elites to the ranks of the commoners. (Id.) "In one-sixth of the cases, elite groups were targeted for extermination." (Id.). And the probability of a ruler assassination was 40 percent. (p. 224).

    Moreover, in 75 percent of cases the crisis ended in revolutions or civil wars (or both), and in one-fifth of cases, recurrent civil wars dragged on for a century or longer. (p. 224). 

    And in 60 percent of cases, exits from the crisis let to the death of the state: it was conquered by another or simply disintegrated into fragments. (p. 224). 

    At this point, according to Turchin, the only viable option to avoid countless decades of societal unrest and a possible bloody civil war is to transform the Republic party to a populist party that can stand up to the elites and force concessions and forge a new social contract. Moreover, as he strongly hints, the Republic party cannot be transformed unless the federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies (which as recent history shows, only serve the elites) are somehow neutered. And, in fact, we saw how the intelligence and law enforcement agencies conspired to weaken and take down Trump. It presents an interesting conundrum: how to reign in such agencies in order to gain the power that would be necessary to reign in those agencies. 

    In short, Turchin offers an interesting perspective on the current factors leading to societal unrest and possible civil war, as well as the way to mitigate or avoid such outcome.