80th Anniversary of Bombing of Hiroshima

Mushroom cloud over Hiroshima (Source)

Today marks the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. A couple weeks or so ago I wrote an article rebutting a revisionist's claim that the bombing was unnecessary and reprehensible. I had several comments to my piece insisting that the revisionists were correct, including a comment from historian David Irving claiming that a letter had been submitted to the Truman Administration three months prior to the bombing containing an official surrender. I asked Irving for a link or more information, but there was no reply. Some other readers indicated I should try watching videos of Irving's speeches because that is where he spoke about the document. However, no specific speech was ever identified. 

    I watched a few speeches I could find, but none discussed his claim. I looked to see if Ron Unz had brought this up as I have found his American Pravda useful for digging up forgotten bits of history that often contradict the mainstream narrative, but found nothing. Now I'm not saying that the information is not out there, but I could not find it. I came across an article at a website on "real history" that appeared to reproduce an article by Irving outlining his discovery of certain documents showing that the Allies were aware that Japan was interested in ending the war, including instructions to the Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union indicating that the Ambassador was to make use of the Soviets in ending the war and that the Japanese Emperor "desires from his heart that [the war] may be quickly terminated," and "to restore peace with all possible speed." 

    This is not a surrender, however. It was only an attempt to open up backdoor channels in order to pursue negotiations. 

    And while the article offered some specificity of what was in the encoded message to the Ambassador, I had already come across other sources noting that there were factions within the Japanese leadership putting out feelers to negotiate peace, including involving the Soviets as intermediaries. 

    I have come across arguments that the Japanese had already been defeated, referencing their lack of access to fuel, raw materials, and manpower, but these issues had already become critical before the Battle of Okinawa and yet the Japanese fought on, even involving civilians in that bloody campaign, giving a taste of what U.S. forces would face if it became necessary to invade Japan. And even if the Japanese leadership was willing to pursue peace negotiations (although that remained a minority position until after the atomic bombs were dropped) there is no guarantee that the war would not have dragged on for months longer. The bombings, if nothing more, greatly sped up the end of the war. 

    Should the U.S. have refrained from using the weapons because the majority of victims would be civilians? That cat was long out of the bag. The Japanese had conducted war against civilians long before the U.S. entered the war--just look at their conduct in Korea and China and other areas they conquered. The U.S. had already been engaged in incendiary bombings of Japanese cities. Moreover, the U.S. had dropped leaflets warning civilians to evacuate. 

     But too often ignored in the discussion of the bombings is its impact on post-War Japan. It turned a violently militaristic society into one of the most pacifistic nations in history.  

     Paul Fussel sums it up well in the title to his August 1981 essay in the New Republic: "Thank God for the Atom Bomb."