Ian from Forgotten Weapons discusses why the M7 is a bad idea. Not just from the perspective of the equipment, but the whole philosophy of its deployment, ignoring nearly a century's worth of experience (including the current Russian-Ukraine War) showing that the majority of engagements are at less than 300 yards (and, in fact, most of the time a soldier would not even be able to see an enemy combatant at 300 yards). Moreover, he raises a couple good points that point to the M7 already being obsolete. First, one of the main reasons for adopting the weapon was to allow troops to engage an enemy firing from long distances, but this is already better handled through explosive drones. Second, the ability to penetrate body armor--the second excuse for this system--can be accomplished by different bullet designs and materials without needing a large cartridge and high barrel pressures. My oldest son, who follows these things, notes that there are YouTubers who have demonstrated that brass bullets (not even something exotic) can easily penetrate body armor.
What the M7 does is prove that the old saying about generals always prepare to fight the last war still runs true. I rather suspect, myself, that the purpose of the program isn't so much to give soldiers better rifles as it is to churn and burn through money with the knowledge that the whole thing will have to be scrapped in the end and billions more spent on a replacement. There just isn't enough money to be made in supporting the established M16/M4 family and a large stockpile of ammunition already sitting in ammunition dumps.
VIDEO: "Why the M7 and 6.8x51mm are Bad Ideas: Welcome to my TED Talk"
Forgotten Weapons (20 min.)
The M7 was a bad idea from the start, and so was the 6.8x51mm cartridge. Not because they weren't competent, but because they were unnecessary and unneeded.
ReplyDeleteThe debate surrounding the effectiveness of the 5.56x45mm cartridge has been going on a long time. Proponents of replacing it cite reports that .224-caliber weapons simply do not possess enough lethality to do the job. Calls have gone out for years, decades really, for a suitable replacement. So what does the Army do? It issues a requirement for a new battle rifle and cartridge for it. And not a new intermediate cartridge and weapon to use it.
The requirements of the new rifle & cartridge were unrealistic from the start. Obsessed with being able to penetrate enemy hard ceramic body armor plates at distance, the DOD/Pentagon required that the new weapon be able to defeat such plates, but in a rifle whose barrel was a mere 13" long. Since muzzle velocity equates to longer range and hitter power down-range, this made no sense. The DOD said that this was to allow a suppressor to be permanently affixed, which is again a ridiculous requirement: "Cans" have to be cleaned, and removal is the best way to do that.
The short barrel was ridiculous, too. A standard issue infantry rifle does not need a barrel that short; 16-18" will do or even 20" - none of which preclude the use of a QD/QA suppressor. A longer barrel also relieves the contracting company of having to meet those ambitious MV targets without having to develop risky new ammunition technology, i.e., the hybrid case by Sig-Sauer. Now, because of that short barrel and the new ammo tech, Lake City Ammunition Plant, the contractor for the U.S. military, is having to build an entirely new facility to make this special cartridge.
Worst of all, the new ammo wasn't even necessary. Existing off-the-shelf solutions, such as 6.5 Creedmoor, 6.5 Grendel and 6mm ARC would have done the job at a fraction of the cost of Sig-Sauer's proposal. All that would have been needed was a switch to a new AR-15 upper and possibly new magazines. Existing AR lowers could have been retained.
As far as armor penetration is concerned, existing cartridges would have worked, including 7.62x51mm AP, as well as newcomers such as 6.5 CM, 6.5 Grendel, and 6mm ARC - suitably fitted with AP tips.
One is tempted to ask what it is that Sig-Sauer "has" on the folks at the Pentagon anyway, given their recent success in securing lucrative contracts. Actionable blackmail? We may never know....
What we do know is that this entire project has been an expensive boondoggle, which has not solved any of the most-pressing small arms needs of the U.S. military. It has lined the pockets of defense contractors, but not American ones. Is that really the best that can be done for the grunts out on the line?
@Ian
ReplyDeleteThanks for the presentation, and your discussion of relevant issues. Pertaining to maximum effect ranges for combat infantrymen, terrain is obviously a very big consideration, but it is far from the only one. Closed-in jungle terrain would seem, on its face, to argue for an assault rifle and an intermediate cartridge as being the best choice. The trouble is, the lived experience of many combat infantrymen coming back from places like the Solomon Islands during WW2, or any of the other island-hopping campaigns, is that light, fast-firing weapons like submachine guns are very useful in certain situations, such as ambush/counter-ambush contact and breaking of contact, or repelling massed human wave attacks, or CQB such as clearing structures such as bunkers.
However, these light weapons had significant limitations, such as poor barrier penetration, deflection of shots by thick vegetation, and insufficient power at intermediate ranges 300-600 yards. Your point that in many instances, opposing forces not being able to see another or see another clearly - is granted, but that does not mean heavier, harder-hitting cartridges do not have their place. Even if you are hosing down an area to keep the enemy's heads down, being able to do it with greater power and authority is never a bad thing, and if one manages to hit enemy personnel, the full-power cartridge is going to be more lethal on the balance than an intermediate or pistol cartridge.
The experience of Afghanistan is not to be discarded lightly; the smart enemy hits you where you don't expect and on terms not favorable to you. Which is why the Taliban and AQ mastered the 300-600 yard envelope, engaging our troops past the effective range of their assault rifles. Again, granted that small, cheap drones will often suffice to take out such threats - but what if your patrol is out of them, having used them up already? Answer: You still need riflemen skilled at making hits in that 300-600 envelope, which is why designated marksmen exist.
Oh, and with the increasing ubiquity of quality optics on battlefields, the naked eye limits at 300 yards increasingly mean little. And since optics extend the useful range of precision weapons, including small arms, doesn't that argue for long-range capability within the typical squad or platoon? As desired as they often are, crew served weapons, air, drones, arty, are not always available.
Thank you for the well-done video...