FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (Updated)

PDF download here. A critique by Bing West at the Small Wars Journal is here.

Update (5/18/2014): A reader asks in the comments what is the value of downloading the manual if, as West writes, the doctrine is flawed. This is a good question, but unfortunately one I probably cannot answer at this time as I have not yet had an opportunity to read the new manual. I included the link to the article by Mr. West because it provided some insight (and a counterpoint) to the contents of the new manual. My response at this point would have to be that the manual may prove of interest to those that follow military matters, and represents the "play-book" that will likely be followed by the military in any future counterinsurgency campaigns.

That said, the issue of whether the United States' COIN strategy is flawed is hotly debated. I've read articles and books from senior military officers and advisors touting the fundamentals of current COIN as a success. It is notable that in 2007, Mr. West wrote:

The COIN manual [speaking of the predecessor to the one linked above] has set the proper strategic tone in Iraq. It has also provided foreign policy elites with an intellectual rationale for grudging acceptance of the fact that the US military is prevailing in Iraq.

In fact, after the successful surge in Iraq, most everyone of any influence over COIN operations seemed to largely favor Petraeus' basic COIN strategy, and the then new FM 3-24 he had co-authored.

It is now, after the fact, that we see criticism of COIN--the "winning hearts and minds" and "nation building" emphasized by Petraeus. (Although, I would note that modern COIN theory has its roots in post-Vietnam evaluations and critiques of that counter-insurgency). For instance,  in 2013, Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry (Ret.) wrote an article published by the Council on Foreign Relations entitled "The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan" that was critical of Gen. Petraeus' COIN doctrine as applied in Afghanistan.  He observed that:

The apparent validation of this doctrine during the 2007 troop surge in Iraq increased its standing. When the Obama administration conducted a comprehensive Afghanistan strategy review in 2009, some military leaders, reinforced by some civilian analysts in influential think tanks, confidently pointed to Field Manual 3-24 as the authoritative playbook for success. When the president ordered the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops into Afghanistan at the end of that year, the military was successful in ensuring that the major tenets of COIN doctrine were also incorporated into the revised operational plan. The stated aim was to secure the Afghan people by employing the method of “clear, hold, and build” -- in other words, push the insurgents out, keep them out, and use the resulting space and time to establish a legitimate government, build capable security forces, and improve the Afghan economy. With persistent outside efforts, advocates of the COIN doctrine asserted, the capacity of the Afghan government would steadily grow, the levels of U.S. and international assistance would decline, and the insurgency would eventually be defeated.

The general thrust of Eikenberry's argument was not, as I understood it, that COIN doctrine was inherently defective, but that it was too vague to implement.Col. Gian P. Gentile published an article entitled "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army" (PDF), that, although critical of COIN, actually takes the diametrically different viewpoint from Eikenberry. Instead of being too vague, Gentile argues that the problem with COIN doctrine is that it describes one or a small number of tactics out of many for defeating an insurgency, and elevates that tactic to strategy. He writes:

...The Army is so tactically oriented toward population-centric counterinsurgency that it cannot think of doing anything else. General Stanley McChrystal’s recently released command guidance to forces in Afghanistan employs all of the dictums of population-centric counterinsurgency and confirms this strategy of tactics. His statement that success in Autumn 2009 Afghanistan will not be determined by the number of enemy killed but by the “shielding” of the civilian population could have easily come out of the pages of FM 3-24, or commander’s talking points during the Iraq Surge. 

These population-centric COIN principles have been turned into immutable rules that are dictating strategy in Afghanistan and having a powerful shaping effect on reorganizing the American Army. A few months ago, when asked about the way ahead for the American military in Afghanistan and how Iraq was comparable to Afghanistan, General David Petraeus acknowledged that the two were very different. But the thing to remember, according to General Petraeus, was that the principles of COIN that the Army has learned in Iraq over the past couple of years are applicable to Afghanistan. 

Those principles belong to the population-centric COIN methodology. If we accept that the principles are applicable, then we have already chosen the way ahead in Afghanistan, which is population-centric nation-building requiring large numbers of American ground combat forces, dispersed into the local population in an effort to win their hearts and minds away from the insurgent enemy, and to eventually build a nation.

(Footnotes omitted). Gentile argues that the military also needs to consider the use of actual, well, military force, to accomplish its objectives (and warns that the current COIN is undermining the military's basic ability to engage in military operations as opposed to social work). But see Oleg Svet's critique at the National Interest, which, does not question the theoretical underpinnings of the "winning hearts and minds," but argues that its implementation failed because too much military force was utilized.

Conversely, Gen. Eikenberry's criticism has, itself, been criticized, and Gen. Petraeus penned a defense of his COIN strategy--at least as implemented in Iraq--published in October 2013 in Foreign Policy. Petraeus argues that if Iraqi forces implemented many of the strategies followed by coalition forces during "the Surge," the Iraqis would succeed against Al Qaeda. R. Scott Moore's paper, "The Basics of Counterinsurgency," (PDF), suggests that the basics of COIN is ... more nation building and hearts and minds tactics.

My feelings on the matter, which I believe I have expressed before, is that the entire strategy in Afghanistan has been a mistake. Afghanistan should have been a punitive campaign with the sole and limited goal to destroy Al Qaeda and inflict as much damage on its supporters as possible, followed by a withdrawal. Repeated as necessary. If the "nation-building" nonsense had not been followed, the battle at Tora-Bora would have been carried out to its end by American troops, and Bin Laden would have died there, instead of sneaking out with the assistance of corrupt Afghan troops.

Moore notes in his paper: "The Department of Defense inadequately defines insurgency as 'an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.'” He suggests a broader definition:

An insurgency is a protracted violent conflict in which one or more groups seek to overthrow or fundamentally change the political or social order in a state or region through the use of sustained violence, subversion, social disruption, and political action.

Similarly, he believes the definition of "counterinsurgency"--“Those military, paramilitary, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”--is too narrow, and advances his own definition:

Counterinsurgency is an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency in order to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability.

What is notable is that under current DOD definitions, or Moore's expanded definitions, both post-invasion Iraq and Afghanistan were not insurgencies. In Iraq, the United States had overthrown the existing government and/or social order. In Afghanistan, the Taliban represented the government (such as it was) at the time of the invasion. In both cases, COIN was not being used to protect the political or social order, but to change the social order. That is, to impose a "democratic" Western-style government on what (especially in Afghanistan) were tribal societies and, in the case of Afghanistan, a theocratic based government. (Notably, post-invasion Iraq also lacks religious tolerance).

Semantics aside, Gentile's basic thesis--that current COIN doctrine is too limited--is correct. To step back a bit, Napoleon is reputed to have said that amateurs discuss tactics while professionals discuss logistics. If we look at examples of successful counterinsurgencies--the Indian Wars in the United States, the Second Boer War, and the Malayan Crises--we see that successful counterinsurgency operations are wars of logistics: denying materials and support to the guerrilla fighters that they needed to survive, while exploiting the logistical advantages of the United States or British forces, respectively. Interestingly, all three of the examples above relied on forced relocation of the populations that supported the insurgency, thus removing sources of food, shelter, intelligence, and moral support. Those supporters that were not removed were destroyed when found. That is, villages friendly to the guerillas, and their crops and herds, were destroyed. Conversely, the United States and British troops enjoyed logistical advantages as to weapons, ammunition, etc., giving them additional freedom in pursuing operations year-round.

Obviously, forcible relocation, while one tactic, is not the only one. Turning the population against the insurgents can be almost as effective as forced relocation. It is no coincidence that, in Iraq, the success of "the Surge" coincided with the Al Qaeda forces having alienated local populations through their extremism and heavy-handed tactics. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was also important that local leaders saw the United States as the most powerful war lord. They respected the sheer power of the United States military. To that extent, "winning hearts and minds" can be a viable strategy under certain circumstances. In Iraq, it was and remains a viable tactic because the country, as a whole, is modern enough to appreciate the benefits of rule of law and social stability. Afghanistan, I would contend, is not.

So why adopt broken strategies? As Svet's article suggests, the most significant reason is that the modern COIN doctrine is palatable to our governing elites. Building health clinics and schools is warm and fuzzy, and does not generate negative publicity. Relocating whole villages to internment camps, while simultaneously destroying the buildings, crops, and livestock left behind, and killing anyone in the area after the relocation, would probably not be received with much enthusiasm in the Western world.

The other reason, I suspect, is that the decision makers are so isolated and removed from the realities on the ground, and what information they receive has to pass through so many sycophantic filters, that decision makers do not have accurate information. I am reminded of the following:

In the beginning was The Plan

and then came the assumptions, 

and the assumptions were without form,

and The Plan was completely without substance,

and the darkness was upon the face of the employees,

and they spoke amongst themselves, saying

"It is a crock of sh** and it stinks."

And the employees went unto their Supervisors, saying:

"It is a pail of dung and none may abide the odor thereof."

And the Supervisors went unto their Division Managers, saying:

"It is a vessel of fertilizer and none may abide it's strength."

And the Division Managers went unto their Systems Managers, saying:

"It contains that which aids plant growth and it is very strong."

And the Systems Managers went unto the General Manager, saying:

"It promotes growth and is very powerful."

And the General Manager went unto the Board, saying:

"This new plan will actively promote the growth and efficiency of this organization."

And the Board looked upon The Plan and saw that it was good,

and The Plan became policy.

THIS IS HOW SH** HAPPENS

            --author unknown