Is It Possible To Successfully Defend A Retreat Against Superior Forces?

Self-defense should be a concern of everyone. Even without a national or worldwide TEOTWAWKI, you could have your very own personal SHTF moment should you be mugged or the victim of a burglary. However, in this post, I am interested in protecting your home (or your retreat, if you will) from a group of raiders.

There are a few articles about this subject on the internet. (See here and here, for general discussion of the topic; here is an article on protecting against vehicles).

However, I question whether it is realistic to assume that you can do more than hold off a small number of attackers. I'm big on examples, so let me use a few:

First I came across this brief account recently in a book about World War I. (I believe this example to be relevant because the weapons that most troops were armed with at the beginning of the war were no different than a prepper or a reaver would use in a TEOTWAWKI situation).

The German Army was only twenty-five miles from Paris on September 3. That day, at the village of Baron, the 49-year-old composer Albéric Magnard barricaded himself in his house and opened fire on the German soldiers who had called for him to come out, killing one of them. His house was set on fire with straw and grenades: he perished inside it. The village was then looted.

Gilbert, Martin. The First World War: a Complete History, p. 68 (Henry Holt and Co., NY: 1994).

The most recent (June 2012) issue of Guns magazine ("Mexican Standoff" in the Rights Watch column) directed me to another example from 2010 that was reported at the Borderland Beat website. I'll quote from Borderland Beat:

The story began in the morning of Saturday November 13, when a group of armed gunmen went to deliver an ultimatum to Don Alejo Garza Tamez: He had 24 hours to turn over his property or suffer the consequences.

Using the diplomacy he had acquired over nearly eight decades of life, Don Alejo flatly announced that not only would he not be surrendering his property, but that he'd be waiting for them.

When the men had left, Don Alejo gathered his workers and ordered them to take Sunday off, he wanted to be alone.

He dedicated the rest of Saturday to taking stock of his weapons and ammunition and creating a military fortress style defense strategy for his home.

That strategy was to take his limited firearms--apparently hunting rifles--and preposition them with ammunition at the different windows in his house so he could quickly move from position to position.

Marines who investigated the scene could only imagine how it was that morning: armed men, their impunity secured, confident they'd soon be owners of yet another property. Nobody, or almost no one, could hold out against a group of heavily armed gunmen. Only Don Alejo.

The trucks entered the ranch and took up positions surrounding the house. The gunmen got out of their trucks, fired shots in the air, and announced they came to take possession of the ranch. They were expecting the terrified occupants to run out, begging for mercy with their hands in the air.

But things didn't go as expected. Don Alejo welcomed them with bullets; the entire army of gunmen returned fire. Don Alejo seemed to multiply, he seemed to be everywhere. The minutes would have seemed endless to those who had seen him as easy prey. Various gunmen were killed on sight. The others, in rage and frustration, intensified the attack by swapping out their assault rifles for grenades.

When everything finally fell silent, the air was left heavy with gunpowder. The holes left in the walls and the windows attested to the violence of the attack. When they went in search of what they had assumed was a large contingent, they were surprised to find only one man, Don Alejo.

The surviving gunmen did not take over the ranch. Thinking the military would arrive at any moment, they decided to run. They left behind what they thought were six corpses, but two of their gunmen had survived.

Don Alejo was inside his house, dead from his wounds. It was unclear to me from the story whether he was killed by gunfire, the grenades, or both.

Police raids also tell a story. For instance, FerFal notes here:

About 5 young able bodied males in the house and a 21 year old women that literally slept with her .45 strapped on a shoulder holster.

They had a nice weapon battery including ARs, scoped 30-06 rifles, shotguns, more than enough ammo, about 20 handguns spread around the house.
The compound/farm in Austin had the perimeter covered with cameras hidden in the trees, all connected to a big screen TV in the living room.
SWAT nailed them without firing a shot, and even though there were more, I counted only 4 operators entering after ramming down the door…
They were all watching a movie in the family room.

So people, FORGET about you super retreat, at least forget about it being a better defendable alternative. It isn’t.
Unless you have at the very least half a dozen people available for round the clock security you’re a sitting duck, and one lonely duck at that. It doesn’t take SWAT, a bunch of guys with an ounce of brains will get to you, specially if they don’t care about shooting the people inside.
Also, you need a real secured perimeter. Cameras with no one checking them are just a waste of time, at least it represents no real layer of protection.
24/7 guards plus good building design for layered security. If anyone thinks they have a secured or defendable retreat without those they are kidding themselves.

So what works? Again, real world examples help, as discussed in this post:

Rhodesian Farmers Defensive Arrangements

(from the Small Wars Council forum)

I knew many Rhodesian farmers and have visited many farmsteads over the years. At every farm, defensive arrangements were made up to suit their particular situation and infrastructure. The following would be a general overview:

1. Most farmers fitted hand-grenade grills to the outside of all windows. Doors leading outside were likewise security grilled.

2. Many farmers built thick walls about a meter in front of bedroom windows to stop bullets, but particularly to deal with RPG 7`s. Beds were never placed against the outside walls of a farmhouse.

3. It was usual to have a designated safe room within the farmhouse that could be defended until support arrived. Sometimes this was a central corridor that allowed the farmer to move into other rooms to attack those outside through the windows. In the loft or ceiling over the safe room, some farmers laid sand bags to deal with possible mortar attack.

4. Every farmhouse in a given area was linked by a radio system called “Agric Alert”. This allowed radio contact with other farmers who formed their own defence units, usually under the umbrella of PATU (Police Anti-Terrorist Unit), which would react to a call from one of their neighbours for assistance. Another means of alarm raising was the use of a signal rocket – The Agric-Alert system was not done away with after the war, such was the lack of trust in Mugabe`s promises. It performed admirably as well when dealing with criminal activity such as stock theft. The alert system arranged for all farmers to check in with each other at a given time in the morning and evening as a means of monitoring their status.

5. Around all farmhouse gardens were erected security fences with barbed wire (or razor wire) and which often had simple alarm systems built into them. Some I believe were electrified, if not before the end of the war, certainly afterwards. Within the fence boundary, every farmer usually had a couple of large dogs. The dogs were fed their largest meal in the morning instead of the evening, in order to help keep them awake at night. Other farmers had geese or ducks, which made excellent guard “dogs.” Gardens were kept deliberately trim so as to keep clear fields of view and fire etc. The farm houses also had outside flood lighting erected in such a way as to blind those outside the fence, but not to interfere with the vision of those within the farmhouse.

6. All farmers and their wives were armed with an assortment of weapons, and most farmers were trained military men. They had at least one assault rifle, usually an FAL 7.62, assorted shot guns, .303 hunting rifles and so forth. It was also not unusual for wives to carry Uzi`s around with them, or other equivalents such as the Rhodesian Cobra. All members of the family were trained on the various weaponry available to them, including the kids. In one famous incident a child successfully fought off the attacking terrorists after both of his parents were wounded. The main defensive weapons were at all times within immediate reach of the adult farmhouse occupants, and were placed next to the bed at night.

7. Some farmers used mine protected vehicles, as a favourite of terrorists was to landmine the driveway outside the fence. A great deal of time was spent looking at the dirt roads for freshly dug earth points and so forth when driving around the farm.

8. Some farm gardens and particular points external to the fence were wired with home-made claymore like devices strategically placed in areas where attackers were likely to take cover. In a few instances farmers deliberately erected “cover positions” for the terrorists to use outside the fence, which were then blown up upon attack. A particular favourite was a section of plastic piping filled with nails, nuts, bolts, screws and so forth. I witnessed tests with these and the tubes cleared large areas of their intended aiming point of all bush cover and leaves from trees etc for about 30 meters into the bush. By placing a number of figure 8`s in front of these tests, it was apparent from the strike patterns that not one of them would have walked again had they been terrorists.

9. Some farmers also hired soldiers on leave to guard their premises at night. Usually these were men looking for extra “beer” money. They were called Bright Lights, and often ended up in fire fights with the terrorists, where they came as a nasty surprise to the terrs when the latter were expecting a nice soft hit and run. Like all farmers in an area, Bright Lights would participate in the support of other farmers when the situation required.

10. Good relationships with farm labour, particularly the house staff, very often warned of problems before they occurred. All of us who grew up in the country have fond memories of those employees who took care of us as kids, and who often placed themselves at great risk for doing so.

Although this article discusses tips for crime in general, there are some valid points for defending a retreat.