Rupert Lowe, a member of parliament in the UK, conducted the investigation that the UK government refused to do. His report is here. I haven't had time to read it (it is 219 pages in total), but there is this from the executive summary:
The Rape Gang Inquiry examined the systematic targeting of vulnerable girls, overwhelmingly White British, by predominantly Muslim Pakistani gangs across towns and cities throughout the United Kingdom. The evidence put to the Inquiry confirms that this scandal constitutes one of the most horrendous failures in the history of the country. Organised networks of perpetrators built coordinated operations that transported victims between locations, supplied them with drugs and alcohol, recorded abuse for distribution and blackmail, and passed girls between multiple adult men. These crimes have been committed for decades, since the 1950s by Pakistanis in particular, and have affected every region of our nation.
The scale of the crimes committed is staggering. It has been previously established that, at the very least, 250,000 young white girls have been subjected to repeated rape, gang rape, trafficking, torture, pregnancy, forced Islamic conversion, and lifelong trauma.1 The true number is probably higher. The perpetrators bear primary responsibility, yet the institutional failures that enabled them for decades must also be confronted. In court records and official inquiries, around 87% of those convicted in these group-based child sexual exploitation (‘CSE’) cases bore distinctively Muslim names.2 The vast majority of men involved in these gangs were not convicted. Dr. Taj Hargey, an imam with the Oxford Islamic Congregation, believes the true proportion of gang members who are Muslims to be around 95%.3 This figure far exceeds the Muslim share of the overall United Kingdom population. The overwhelming majority of the rape gang networks consisted entirely of men from Muslim backgrounds – predominantly of Pakistani heritage, although smaller groups from Somali, Iranian, Syrian, Turkish, and other Muslim origins were also involved.
It appears part of the reason that nothing was done was because the victims were from the working class and held in disdain by authorities because of it. Daniel Heneghan, writing on X, sums this point up:
We have class issues in this country, though we deny it, but nothing like the deep loathing that the UK middle classes (not the upper classes) have for the working class. We are talking about the university credentialed class (used to be a lot smaller). A whole class of educators, officers, medical, engineers, managers. One life example, I recall on Youtube, an interview with a working-class electrician. In the engineering firm that we worked at managment/engineering never addressed him by his name, not his first name nor his last name (Mr. Raines, for example) but simply as "Sparks". "Hey Sparks, take a look at this....". He's an electricians, so "Sparks", get it. The intent was to alienated, even dehumanize, and it's still there working today.
Deep, deep, deep loathing. A loathing that was as deep as American racism at it's worst.
Well, to be fair, it exists here in the U.S. among much of the educated class. Having come from a working-poor background, I witnessed much of it first hand.
But back to the UK grooming gang scandal, one of the questions that needs to be addressed is the government's policy of covering up what was going on. Instapundit linked to this article at the Pimlico Journal that delves into this issue: "Manchester Labour's Grooming Gang Complicity." But one item you should pay attention to are the comments about ethnic voting blocs:
Much has been said of the biraderi (or baraderi), clan dimension
to South Asian local politics recently, and it is impossible to
understand the political dynamics that led to the rise of figures like
Ahmed and Akhtar without understanding biraderi. While this has become a more salient factor in political discourse by virtue of the breakaway
of certain heavily Muslim constituencies to the so-called ‘Gaza
Independents’ since 2024, in reality, it has been a known and relevant
fact of local party politics for many decades. Academic interest in the
phenomenon began to pick up in the 2010s as the surprise victory of
George Galloway in the Bradford West by-election revealed that minority
votes were not exclusively determined by individual loyalties to the
Labour Party. In fact, it turned out that ‘elders’ and ‘community
leaders’ were incentivised by established local politicians to make
ethnicity-based and religion-based claims for their communities, and
these ‘elders’ and ‘community leaders’ could return them with bloc votes
— from which the victory of Galloway’s Respect and the more recent
Muslim First parties are an aberration. This patronage system made such
constituencies effectively unpollable, each a black box with dynamics
comprehensible only to those with local knowledge.
In short, though, as the article explains, it is is this political power and influence that enabled the gangs to continue without any real interference. The fear of upsetting "community relations" both acted as a damper on any criminal investigation and enforcement, while also serving as the excuse to promote key players into positions of authority over the police and other agencies that would have been charged with investigating the abuse of the girls. The author points out:
One of the starkest failures appears to be in the fact that men like Akhtar were able to accumulate vast amounts of formal and informal power with few, if any checks. The web of relationships between the state, third sector, and ‘communities’ drastically increased the number of areas vulnerable to abuse. This is perhaps best illustrated by the data-loss saga which occurred in 2011. The council suspiciously failed to inform the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) about the theft of twenty-one laptops holding important data on victims of Child Sexual Exploitation. A meeting of the council’s Corporate Governance Board and IT Governance Board, itself chaired by Akhtar, failed to record any minutes and was told that a report was being prepared to recommend that the Senior Leadership team should not file the loss with the ICO. In fact, it turned out the ICO only discovered the incident due to press reporting.
Akhtar appears at every juncture in the Rotherham story and at every institutional pressure point: community brokerage, police liaison, youth and neighbourhood activity, licensing and regulatory functions, publicly funded community organisations, a major official inspection’s account of local fear and power, a CSE handover allegation, and the council data-loss scandal involving sensitive information. In fact, his own daughter’s employment came to light in 2019 when the charity she worked for, Rotherham Rise, was criticised for employing her in a senior role supporting victims of Child Sexual Exploitation. This is a remarkable mark on the town for a single individual and his family.
He is representative of the wider problem: a total failure by the authorities, and sometimes outright collusion, in one of the worst atrocities ever perpetrated on British soil. It would be no surprise to discover hundreds of Jahangir Akhtars up and down the country, and no one, least of all in the Labour Party, has done enough to uncover the full story. Given the importance of baradiri networks as powerbrokers in (particularly) Labour local politics, it does not take much thinking to explain the reluctance of its senior politicians to upset the apple cart.
We have seen a similar dynamic with the rampant fraud among the Somali community in Minnesota.
For my LDS readers, this should remind them of the various secret combinations (including the Gadianton Robbers) that arose in Nephite society in order to protect its members from prosecution and to gain political power and wealth. When I was a kid, there was few clear examples of this to point to outside of organized crime syndicates, but now it seems that nearly every month we are shown evidence of such groups permeating our society and government.
