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Wednesday, February 14, 2018

The Z Blog Discusses The Possible Future of Political Violence

The dead body of Benito Mussolini next to his mistress
Claretta Petacci and those of other executed fascists,
on display in Milan on 29 April 1945, in Piazzale Loreto.
Mussolini's is the second body from the left. (Source).
The Z Blog had posted an article the other day entitled, "Political Violence" that has some comments on how the lack of political violence is shaping modern politics. The author writes:
The decline in political violence in the West sounds like a good thing. ... The rise of a global order not only reduced the need for violence between countries. It may have reduced the need for violence within countries, as the political factions merged into a unified managerial ruling class. Rule by hyper-educated bureaucrat means disputes are handled over cappuccinos. 
             This may not be a good thing. For all of human history, power brought risk. The higher someone climbed the hierarchy, the greater their responsibilities and the greater their personal risk. The very real threat of personal violence had a tempering effect. Today, people in the managerial elite don’t have to worried about getting fired, much less assassinated. They occupy a world where no one is ever held accountable for their actions. As a result, they have become dangerously cavalier about their duties. 
          In fact, the main feature of the on-going domestic espionage scandal of the last administration is the brazen and reckless way the players went about it. High moral character is what leads good men do the right thing when no one is looking. Fear of the hangman is what leads lesser men do the right thing when no one is looking. In the political game, personal risk has always been what weeds the reckless and dangerous from the game. That’s been removed so our political class is full of reckless and stupid people.
       He also discusses the why of the decline in political violence. And it comes down the fact that power has shifted to the bureaucracy. He explains that, for instance, the killing of a head of state doesn't make much sense today because power (especially over long term policy) does not reside in such a leader. Rather, "[t]he real political power is the cabal of rich people under the waterline, controlling things out of site of the public. Regicide has no value these days." Similarly, attacks on people (as common with most terrorist attacks) to put pressure on the state is similarly unavailing. Not only do the people, even in democratic nations, have only limited influence, but as Z Man writes, "[t]oday, the state is not the only player and not the most important player in most of the world." He muses that killing a few billionaires would likely have more impact than some grandiose public act of terrorism. He suggests, instead, that  "[m]aybe what comes next is a new brand of political violence that meets the needs of the managerial state. Instead of people shooting political players, managerial class types will get snuffed out when going for their mocha latte."

        I had touched on this topic in a couple pieces I wrote back in 2014: "Why Terrorism Generally Fails" and "Why Terrorism Generally Fails--A Couple More Examples." In the first article, I wrote:
        History and experience shows that the most successful method to influence policy, at least in a republic, is to target and influence particular individuals. For example, the lobbyists of K-Street map out the paths of power and learn who are the key officials. They understand that changing the direction of policy is a long road, requiring a favorable opinion or finding from one official, providing pre-written legislation or rules, helping one politician with a re-election campaign, but perhaps helping the opponent of another. They understand that it can be more important to influence staff and advisors than the actual decision makers. The public, at large, is not important except for the purposes of elections. 
        I would propose that terrorist organizations that act like lobbyists--except using threats and force rather than money--would be more successful than terrorists who believe that their goals can be accomplished simply by blowing up targets based on either their visibility or ease of access.
As I went on to note, you will often see the same names pop up over and over in regard to significant political decisions, because there are certain key players in and between organizations. For instance, we have seen this in regard to the scandal of the Trump dossier where we see many of the same names involved with the Trump dossier that were involved with the decision not to investigate or prosecute Hillary Clinton as to her emails, that were involved in the Uranium One, and so on. We also see connections--sometimes spouses or siblings--that provide a connection between two different organizations. I give more examples of this in my second piece cited above. But, as I noted in those pieces, terrorist organizations seem to lack the interest or sophistication to adapt their tactics and gather the necessary intelligence on those that are really pulling the strings.

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