For those of you interested, you can download a copy of the report from the Texas House of Representatives website (here).
I've only skimmed through a few sections, but I have to say that I am disappointed, although not surprised, at the inordinate attention to the failure to establish a command post. The report indicates that the school district's active shooter policy called for Uvalde school district Police Chief Arredondo to be the incident commander in any active shooter response. But he was one of the first at the scene and already in the hallway. Would it have really helped for him to set up a command post in the principal's office or outside? The shooter was already shooting students and located in a small, clearly defined and restricted area (the two classrooms). I doubt that the failure to rapidly and decisively act would not have been assisted by forming a command post. Maybe if law enforcement had to secure a wider area and then search to locate the shooter, but not in this situation. All the decision making in this case needed to be made outside the classroom doors and in a matter of seconds.
According to the report, the doors to Rooms 111 and 112 (where the shootings occurred) were required to be locked at all times. I'm curious how the shooter knew to go to the one room that had a defective lock (Room 111) even though the problem had only arisen in March 2022 (see p. 30). And maybe I'm missing something, but in watching the video it certainly appeared that the shooter went directly to that classroom--he certainly wasn't trying the doors to other classrooms. Did someone supply him with information concerning that door?
And, for that matter, why was the west door to the west building, which the attacker used for access, unlocked when it was supposed to be locked?